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The Constitution of Lesotho, 1993 has a supremacy clause 
which ordinarily empowers the judiciary to review the actions of 
other branches of government. However, the judiciary in Lesotho 
seems to treat the legislative process with deference. This 
deference seems to be based on the old common law notion of 
the non-intervention of the judiciary in the legislative process. 
The notion has its roots in the British constitutional system. The 
Constitution of Lesotho has even protected this doctrine through 
a constitutional ouster clause in section 80(5). The main 
question which this paper seeks to answer is whether indeed the 
common law notion of non-intervention in the legislative process 
is part of the constitutional law of Lesotho. In the end, the paper 
uses South African jurisprudence on the review of the legislative 
process to make a case that Lesotho can use the supremacy 
clause in the constitution and other constitutional doctrines such 
as the rule of law and legality to break with the common law 
notion of non-interventionism. 
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1 Introduction 
The Constitution of Lesotho, 1993 like the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa, 1996 cherishes the notion of constitutional supremacy.1 That 
notwithstanding, the notion exists against the strong backdrop of the British-
based design of the institutions of government. Consequently, British 
constitutional theory undergirds constitutional design in Lesotho.2 Despite 
the many influences that the South African law has had on Lesotho law 
generally,3 constitutional law – due to the strong English influence – remains 
defiant. One of the areas which remains faithful to the English concept of 
inter-branch relationship is the review of parliamentary work in general, and 
the legislative process in particular, by the courts of law.4 The English law 
is almost settled, and it has been widely exported to the broader 
commonwealth family of constitutions,5 that due to the time-honoured 
doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, the work of parliament may not be 
vitiated by any authority; not even by a court of law. This rule has been the 
subject of long and sometimes contradictory scholarly and judicial 
engagement.6 However, the classical analysis of it remains that of the 
British scholar, Dicey.7 In his formulation, the notion of parliamentary 
sovereignty involves three "traits". The first one is the omnipotence of 
parliament; "the power of the legislature to alter any law, fundamental or 
otherwise, as freely and in the same manner as other laws".8 The second 
one is that there is one corpus of law. The idea of having a distinction 
                                            
  Hoolo 'Nyane. LLB (Lesotho) LLM (NWU) LLD (UNISA). Associate Professor and 
Head of Public and Environmental Law Department, School of Law, University of 
Limpopo, South Africa. E-mail: hoolo.nyane@ul.ac.za. 
1  Section 2 of the Constitution of Lesotho, 1993 (hereafter Constitution of Lesotho) 
provides that "[t] his Constitution is the supreme law of Lesotho and if any other law 
is inconsistent with this Constitution, that other law shall, to the extent of the 
inconsistency, be void". The supremacy clause in the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa, 1996 (hereafter the South African Constitution) is embodied under s 2 
too. The legal effect of constitutional supremacy has been the subject of several 
formative judgements, to wit; In re Certification of South Africa 1996 4 SA 744 (CC); 
S v Makwanyane 1995 6 BCLR 665 (CC); Executive Council of the Western Cape 
Legislature v President of the Republic of South Africa 1995 10 BCLR 1289 (CC).  
2  See Palmer and Poulter Legal System of Lesotho 223; 'Nyane "Development of the 
Constitution of Lesotho" 121; 'Nyane 2014 Lesotho LJ 59. 
3  Lesotho shares the Roman-Dutch common law with South Africa. See Beardsley 
1970 J Afr L 198; Palmer 1969 J Afr L 127. However, the development of common 
law in South Africa is much more advanced than in Lesotho, and Lesotho depends 
disproportionately on advancements in South Africa.  
4  See s 80(1) of the Constitution of Lesotho. The section is the mirror-image of s 2(1) 
of the United Kingdom Parliament Act of 1911 as amended in 1949 by United 
Kingdom Parliament Act of 1949. 
5  De Smith New Commonwealth and its Constitutions 543. 
6  Goldsworthy Parliamentary Sovereignty 30; Delaney 2013 Nw U L Rev 543; Barber 
2011 ICON 144; Tucker 2011 OJLS 72. 
7  Dicey Study of the Law of the Constitution ch II. 
8  Dicey Study of the Law of the Constitution 83. 
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between constitutional law and other ordinary law, so that the former 
becomes the "higher law", is alien to the classical English design. He posited 
that:9 
There is under the English constitution no marked or clear distinction between 
laws which are not fundamental or constitutional and laws which are 
fundamental or constitutional. 
The third one, which is more closely related to the subject under 
investigation here, is the non-reviewability of parliament; "the non-existence 
of any judicial or other authority having the right to nullify an Act of 
Parliament, or to treat it as void or unconstitutional".10 In terms of this tenet, 
the work of parliament is immune to review and sacrosanct, whether 
substantively or procedurally. 
Whether this classic formulation is or has ever been part of Lesotho's 
constitutional law is a matter of controversy; regard being had to the fact 
that Lesotho has always had a written constitution since independence in 
1966 – even prior to that date11 – which embodied the supremacy clause.12 
The judicial attitude is divided on this aspect. In the case of Khaketla v 
Honourable Prime Minister,13 which was decided in 1985 when the 
Constitution was still suspended,14 the court declined to nullify the law, citing 
the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. In a similar manner, the court in 
the case of Tsang v Minister of Foreign Affairs15 reiterated the position in 
the Khaketla case. But the Court of Appeal, in a much more convincing 
decision in the case of Attorney General v Swissbourgh Diamond Mine,16 
confirmed the finding of the High Court that parliamentary sovereignty, at 
least in its classical formulation, is not part of Lesotho's constitutional law. 
As a result of this decision, the courts in Lesotho have declared certain 
pieces of legislation unconstitutional with relative ease.17 Whilst they are 
now almost comfortable with the substantive review of parliament and the 
                                            
9  Dicey Study of the Law of the Constitution 85. 
10  Dicey Study of the Law of the Constitution 85. 
11  See the Basutoland Constitutions of 1959 and 1965. 
12  Section 2 of the Lesotho Constitution of 1966 embodied the supremacy clause. 
13  Khaketla v The Honourable Prime Minister (CIV/APN/145/85) [1985] LSCA 118 (24 
July 1985) (hereafter the Khaketla case). 
14  The 1966 Constitution of Lesotho was suspended in 1970. For the detail on the 
suspension of that Constitution, see Khaketla Lesotho 1970 103; Macartney 1973 
Government and Change 473.  
15  Tsang v Minister of Foreign Affairs 1993-94 LLR-LB 45 (HC) (hereafter the Tsang 
case). 
16  Attorney General v Swissbourgh Diamond Mine LAC (1995-99) 214 (hereafter the 
Swissbourgh Diamond Mine case). 
17  See Attorney General v Mopa LAC (2000-2004) 427; Peta v Minister of Law, 
Constitutional Affairs and Human Rights (CC 11/2016) [2018] LSHC 3 (18 May 
2018). 
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review of administrative decisions,18 the review of a legislative process 
continues to be unsettled. The question is further complicated by the 
Constitution, which makes the parliament a master of its own procedure.19 
The same Constitution compounds the matter even further by capping it with 
an ouster clause; that once the Speaker of parliament has certified that the 
procedure for enacting any piece of legislation has been followed, such 
certification may not be questioned in any court of law. 
As such, the question of whether a court of law can review the legislative 
process in Lesotho continues to haunt constitutional scholarship in the 
country. Much as the question is relatively settled in South Africa, the courts 
in Lesotho seem to take a deferential approach to the question.20 Influenced 
by the common law non-interventionist approach to the internal legislative 
process, and the tapestry of the Constitution of Lesotho, the courts seem to 
respect the parliament as it relates to the internal affairs of parliament. 
Hence, the purpose of this paper is to denounce this approach as being 
contrary to the broader schematisation of the Constitution of Lesotho 
anchored by the devices of constitutionalism such as the rule of law, legality, 
the separation of powers and, indeed, the hallowed notion of the 
independence of the judiciary. The paper uses some lessons from South 
Africa, where the judiciary has unequivocally jettisoned the notion of 
parliamentary privilege and has employed devices such as legality and the 
rule of law to justify its unrestrained intervention in the so-called "internal 
affairs" of parliament. The paper methodically scrutinises decided cases in 
Lesotho and South Africa in the context of the broader constitutional designs 
of each country. The usual caution that accompanies comparative 
constitutional studies is issued, that one should not blindly presume that 
South African constitutional jurisprudence can be transplanted mutatis 
mutandis into Lesotho. The paper starts off by re-problematising the theory 
on which the review of the legislative process is based, and proceeds to 
                                            
18  Chalatse v The Acting Chief Justice (C of A CIV NO/63/2014) [2015] LSCA 19 (7 
August 2015); Raphuthing v Chairman of the Disciplinary Hearing C of A (CIV) 
45/2014 [2015] LSCA 2 (7 August 2015). 
19  See s 80(5) of the Constitution. Also see Lesotho Constitutional Court decision in 
Transformation Resource Centre v Speaker of the National Assembly (Constitutional 
Case No 4 of 2017) [2017] LSHC 23 (30 November 2017) (hereafter the 
Transformation Resource Centre case). 
20  In the Transformation Resource Centre case paras 20 and 21, the court said, "This 
brings me to [applicants'] second proposition … that the Standing Orders of the 
National Assembly … provide for peremptory procedural requirement for public 
participation… . It rests on the fallacy that the internal rules of parliament made 
pursuant to section 81(1) have constitutional force and, therefore any irregularity in 
following them is violation of a peremptory constitutional procedure. This proposition 
raises issues which have implication for the separation of powers and the jurisdiction 
of courts to enforce internal rules of parliament." 
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study the judicial approaches to the review of the legislative process in each 
of the two countries under study herein.  
2 Revisiting the theories of judicial review of legislative 
process 
2.1 Demarcation of judicial review of legislative process 
Judicial review as a device used by courts to supervise administrative, 
executive or judicial actions has become a very complex notion which takes 
various forms.21 Whatever form it takes, the notion of judicial review still 
depends on the broader constitutional design of a country. In relation to 
judicial review, countries fall into two loose families – the Westminster family 
and the American family. The Westminster models follow the predominantly 
"weak" judicial review system, due in large part to their notion of 
parliamentary sovereignty,22 which is known for its animosity towards any 
form of check on the power of parliament which, in those designs, 
permeates almost all aspects of governmental power. It is adroitly captured 
by Allan and Thomson thus:23 
In some countries … the judges are permitted to review legislation in order to 
establish whether it complies with the … constitution. In the United Kingdom, 
the absence of a written constitution with the status of a high law and the 
doctrine of parliamentary supremacy prevent the judge from exercising this 
role. 
In the Westminster-based model the court's power of review is limited to the 
way in which the power conferred by parliament is exercised, otherwise 
known as the doctrine of ultra vires.24 That is basically judicial review in the 
                                            
21  Hoexter Administrative Law 109.  
22  Harel and Shinar 2012 ICON 950. At 952 and 953 the authors contend that 
jurisdictions including the UK, Canada, New Zealand, and several states and 
territories of Australia have adopted schemes that can be characterised as forms of 
constrained judicial review, and on the other hand they argue that in the American 
style, "judicial review [is] also known as strong judicial review. Under that view, the 
judiciary is the 'ultimate expositor' of constitutional meaning, having the final say over 
constitutional interpretation". Also see Arenson 1996 Deakin L Rev 37.  
23  Allen and Thomson Cases and Materials 541. 
24  See Johannesburg Consolidated Investment Co v Johannesburg Town Council 1903 
TS 111. The overriding justification for judicial intervention is the doctrine of ultra 
vires – the doctrine that power (vires) must be exercised within the confines of the 
law set out by parliament. As Hoexter pointedly contends at 111, "The doctrine … is 
tied to constitutional fundamentals associated with the Westminster system: 
separation of powers, parliamentary sovereignty and the rule of law …. The 
legislature is the supreme lawmaker, while the function of the courts is to apply the 
law made by it". 
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administrative-law sense; "the power of the courts to scrutinise and set 
aside administrative decisions on the basis of certain grounds".25 
Judicial review in the constitutional designs that follow the American model 
adopts a somewhat different approach. Since the decision in Marbury v 
Madison,26 the American model of judicial review has been growing rapidly, 
to the extent that it has even taken on the form of being a threat to 
majoritarianism.27 Some scholars have even dared to call it the basis for 
"judicial supremacy".28 The American model is anchored on "strong review"; 
that "the judiciary is the 'ultimate expositor' of constitutional meaning, having 
the final say over constitutional interpretation".29 
Nevertheless, despite these marked differences in the models of judicial 
review in the Westminster and American models, there seem to be some 
commonalities when it comes to the judicial review of the legislative 
process. The review of the legislative process is different from substantive 
review in that the latter is by and large concerned with the compliance of the 
legislation with the Constitution.30 Many a time, substantive review has to 
do with the question of whether a certain constitutional norm has been 
violated; invariably whether a "certain statute infringes upon individual 
liberties or rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights".31 It is less concerned 
about the propriety of the process that was followed in enacting the statute 
in question. It differs from procedural review in that procedural review is a 
"form of judicial review in which courts: either a) determine the validity of 
statutes based on an examination of the procedure leading to their 
enactment; or b) oversee the adherence to procedural rules whilst the 
legislative process is going on."32 
In this aspect of process there is similarity between the Westminster and 
American models. Both of them, albeit to varying degrees, accord some 
measure of deference to the internal processes of parliament. The courts 
are, as a general rule, not expected to interfere with the internal processes 
of parliament, even when there is an allegation of impropriety or illegality.33 
                                            
25  Hoexter Administrative Law 109. 
26  Marbury v Madison 5 US (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
27  Waldron 2006 Yale LJ 1346. Bickel Least Dangerous Branch 16-17 contends that, 
"[J]udicial review is a counter-majoritarian force in our system. ... [W]hen the 
Supreme Court declares unconstitutional a legislative act ... it thwarts the will of 
representatives of the actual people of the here and now ….” 
28  Harel and Shinar 2012 ICON 950. 
29  Harel and Shinar 2012 ICON 953. 
30  Bar-Siman-Tov 2011 BU L Rev 1915. 
31  Bar-Siman-Tov 2011 BU L Rev 1923. 
32  Bar-Siman-Tov 2011 BU L Rev 1921. 
33  The point was made rather succinctly and poetically in the case of British Railways 
Board v Pickin [1974] 1 All ER 609 622 as thus, "It must surely be for Parliament to 
lay down the procedures which are to be followed before a bill can become an Act. 
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This non-interventionist approach has dominated the court-parliament 
relationship in both models since time immemorial. However, some 
modifications are beginning to be introduced in countries like South Africa, 
where it has been argued that a court of law may intervene in the internal 
affairs of parliament on the basis of the ascendency of the notion of legality. 
2.2  The origins and rationale for non-interventionism 
The protection of parliamentary privilege is, like most devices of modern day 
parliamentary practice, a by-product of the sixteenth and seventeenth 
century struggles between parliament and the crown in England.34 Privilege 
is classically a composite concept which protects not only the speeches of 
members of parliament but also the internal proceedings of parliament.35 
Privilege originated in the sad practice in England whereby the King used 
to have informers about the proceedings of parliament and the speeches of 
individual members of parliament, after which those members of parliament 
who were against the King were targeted with prosecutions and other forms 
of assaults because of what they had said or done in parliament. The zenith 
of this struggle between the Tudors and the Crown on the one hand and the 
House of Commons on the other occurred in 1512 during the case of 
Richard Strode.36 This was the case in which Richard Strode, a member of 
the House of Commons, introduced a series of Bills that were regarded as 
offensive to the reigning King Henry VIII.37 He was prosecuted and a heavy 
fine and imprisonment were imposed on him. The House of Commons was 
particularly displeased with what happened to Strode and retaliated by 
enacting the law that became the turning point, and arguably the basis for 
the notion of parliamentary privilege as it is understood today in 
parliamentary practice throughout the world. The law annulled and 
invalidated the Court's decision on Strode. It provided emphatically, and in 
a rather ad hominem manner, that:38 
                                            
It must be for Parliament to decide whether its decreed procedures have in fact been 
followed. It must be for Parliament to lay down and to construe its standing orders 
and further to decide whether they have been obeyed; it must be for Parliament to 
decide whether in any particular case to dispense with compliance with such orders. 
It must be for Parliament to decide whether it is satisfied that an Act should be 
passed in the form and with the wording set out in the Act. It must be for Parliament 
to decide what documentary material or testimony it requires and the extent to which 
Parliamentary privilege should attach. It would be impracticable and undesirable for 
the High Court of Justice to embark on an enquiry concerning the effect or the 
effectiveness of the internal procedures in the High Court of Parliament or an enquiry 
into whether in any particular case those procedures were effectively followed." 
34  Salva 1963 Philip LJ 477; May Erskine May's Treatise 48; Steele 2012 Nott LJ 43. 
35  May Erskine May's Treatise 48. 
36  Yankwich 1950 U Pa L Rev 960; Cella 1968 Suffolk U L Rev 1.  
37  Salva 1963 Philip LJ 477. 
38  Hatsell Precedents of Proceedings in the House of Commons 86. 
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All suits, condemnations, executions, fine, amerciaments, punishments, 
connections, grants, charge, and impositions, put or had, or hereafter to be 
put or had, upon the said Richard, and to every other person or persons afore 
specified, that now be of this present Parliament, or that of any Parliament, 
thereafter shall be, for any Bill, speaking, reasoning, or declaring of any matter 
or matters concerning the Parliament, to be communed and treated or, be 
utterly void and of none effect. 
Although the law was ad hominem and retroactive in nature, it also 
established the rule for the future relationship between parliament and the 
courts in relation to the internal proceedings of parliament. Nevertheless, 
despite this definite declaration of privilege, the struggles between 
parliament and the Crown never abated. In the person of the sovereign, the 
Crown was still hugely interested in the internal proceedings of parliament.. 
Parliament finally triumphed over the monarch after the Revolution of 
1688.39 Through the Bill of Rights (1689), the privilege of parliament was 
sealed through absolute immunisation. The Bill of Rights provided that "the 
freedom of speech, and debate or proceedings in Parliament, ought not to 
be impeached or questioned in any court or place out of Parliament."40 
In the United States, privilege was received through the doctrine of "enrolled 
bill" in the case of Field v Clark.41 This case established that in accordance 
with the principle of privilege of parliament provided in the English Bill of 
Rights (1689), the signature of the Speaker of the House of Representatives 
on an "enrolled bill" was conclusive evidence that the Bill had been properly 
passed, and it might not be called into question or impeached in the courts 
of law. It was not proper to inquire into the journals of parliament to inquire 
whether or not the Bill had been properly passed. 
It is apparent that the privilege of parliament has developed from its classical 
beginnings, where it was intended to shield parliament and its members 
against the Crown. It has grown in its scope and purpose to the stage where 
today it is protecting members of parliament not only against the monarch 
or executive, but even against everyone else.42 
While the original rationale for privilege was to protect parliament and its 
members against unscrupulous monarchs in England, the notion has 
acquired many different purposes over time.43 Okpaluba articulates six 
justifications for the non-intervention of the courts in internal parliamentary 
                                            
39  Bradley and Ewing Constitutional and Administrative Law 54-57. 
40  Bill of Rights (1689). The principle was to be reiterated in later cases in England, 
such as Edinburgh & Dalkeith Railway v Wauchope (1842) 8 CI and F710 725; Lee 
v Bude &Torrington Railway Co 1871 LR 6 CP 577.  
41  Field v Clark 143 US 649 (1892). 
42  Yankwich 1950 U Pa L Rev 960.  
43  See Andrews Works of James Wilson quoted in Okpaluba 2015 CILSA 188. 
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processes.44 They are: a) immunity against prosecution: protection against 
possible prosecution by an unfriendly executive and conviction by a hostile 
judiciary; b) immunity from deterrents to the uninhibited discharge of their 
legislative duty; c) the independence of parliament: the legislature as a key 
organ of democratic government ought to enjoy absolute independence 
from outside interference or control; d) the smooth management of 
parliament: appeals to the courts as to whether the behaviour of a member 
of the legislature does or does not merit a particular sanction would impair 
the proper functioning of the chamber by enmeshing it in legal proceedings; 
e) reciprocity: judicial abstention from interference in parliamentary 
proceedings guarantees parliamentary abstention from interference in the 
judicial process; and f) the availability of remedies: a legislature could 
provide its own remedies for injustice perpetrated against a member by itself 
or its officers. A member who is dissatisfied with internal decisions can 
appeal to the voters.45 
These justifications can be collapsed into two main rationales for 
parliamentary privilege. The first one is the protection of the freedom of 
members and the house of parliament from external interference and 
inhibition. The second one is the hackneyed principle of the separation of 
powers. Both of these two main justifications are in synch with contemporary 
concepts of the freedom of speech46 and the separation of powers.47 
2.3  The "new approach": a departure from non-interventionism 
Despite its antiquity and justification,48 the notion of parliamentary privilege 
is showing some signs of attenuation from its classical form, in which the 
protection was absolute, into a "new model" based on a sensitive balance 
between legality on the one hand and the separation of powers on the 
other.49 This new approach represents a marked departure from the 
absolute immunity that parliament used to enjoy in its internal proceedings. 
It is best represented by the dictum of the Constitutional Court of South 
                                            
44  Okpaluba 2015 CILSA 183. 
45  Okpaluba 2015 CILSA 192. 
46  See the cases of Speaker of the National Assembly v De Lille 1999 4 SA 863 (SCA) 
(hereafter the De Lille case); Mazibuko v Sisulu 2013 11 BCLR 1297 (CC) (hereafter 
the Mazibuko case). 
47  Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the National Assembly 2006 6 SA 416 
(CC) (hereafter Doctors for Life International case). 
48  Okpaluba 2015 CILSA 190; Sakoane 2000 Lesotho LJ 39. 
49  Kretzmer 1988 Tel Aviv U Stud L 95; Navot 2006 Israel L Rev 183. 
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Africa in the case of President of the Republic of South Africa v United 
Democratic Movement,50 thus:51 
Having regard to the importance of the Legislature in a democracy and the 
deference to which it is entitled from the other branches of government, it 
would not be in the interests of justice for a Court to interfere with its will unless 
it is absolutely necessary to avoid likely irreparable harm and then only in the 
least intrusive manner possible with due regard to the interests of others who 
might be affected by the impugned legislation. Where the legislation amends 
the Constitution and has thus achieved the special support required by the 
Constitution, Courts should be all the more astute not to thwart the will of the 
Legislature save in extreme cases. 
However, it should be noted that the nature of this new approach is far from 
being clear, as scholars and judiciaries are continuing to grapple with its 
true nature.52 Flashes of this new approach are flickering in the majority of 
jurisdictions,53 but they are arguably brightest in the United States of 
                                            
50  President of the Republic of South Africa v United Democratic Movement 2003 1 SA 
472 (CC) (hereafter the UDM case). 
51  See the UDM case para 31. It would seem that the approach suggested in casu is 
that as a general rule, a court will be slow to intervene in the internal proceedings of 
parliament. The courts may intervene in "extreme cases", however. Also see 
Okpaluba and Mhango 2017 LDD 1. This approach also became evident in the Israeli 
Supreme Court Decision in the case of Sarid v Knesset Speaker (1981) 36 (2) PD 
198. This was the case in which the Speaker of the Knesset (parliament) had 
changed the times for the sitting of the house from 11 am to 5 am. An opposition 
member had tabled the motion of no confidence in the House, expecting it to be 
deliberated and be voted upon, in the morning, as was the tradition. However, it 
transpired that most members of House allied to government were travelling and 
could be available only late in the afternoon. As a result, the Speaker postponed the 
sitting to late in the afternoon. The decision of the Speaker was challenged. The 
Speaker's defence was that the decision was part of the internal affairs of parliament 
and thus non-justiciable. The Court agreed but observed at para 9 that, "It seems … 
that these opposing considerations of the rule of law, on the one hand, and respect 
for the Knesset's special standing on the other hand, require a judicial balance, which 
is based on restraint, yet does not yield to complete impotence. This self-restraint 
must be based on a standard which will define those areas in which the court will not 
interfere out of respect for the uniqueness of the Knesset as the people's elected 
body, and those in which the court will intervene to preserve the rule of law in the 
legislature." 
52  In the Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly 2016 3 SA 
580 (CC) (hereafter called EFF I case) para 93, the court attempted, but in vain, to 
provide some guidelines on the "new approach" thus, "It falls outside the parameters 
of judicial authority to prescribe to the National Assembly … what mechanisms to 
establish and which mandate to give them, for the purpose of holding the Executive 
accountable and fulfilling its oversight role of the Executive or organs of State in 
general. The mechanics of how to go about fulfilling these constitutional obligations 
is a discretionary matter best left to the National Assembly. Ours is a much broader 
and less intrusive role. And that is to determine whether what the National Assembly 
did does in substance and in reality amount to fulfilment of its constitutional 
obligations. That is the sum total of the constitutionally permissible judicial enquiry 
to be embarked upon". 
53  For Brazil, see Barroso da Graca 2018 UCL JL and J 55; for Nigeria see Taiwo 2009 
Malawi LJ 236; in relation to India see Jain 1967 JILI 205, who contends that, "[o]ur 
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America and South Africa. The United States started to punch some holes 
earlier in the doctrine of "an enrolled bill", which was entrenched in the 
jurisprudence of that country, in the case of Field v Clark.54 The essence of 
the new approach is that the internal processes of parliament should still be 
respected, as parliament is a co-equal branch of government, but the courts 
should intervene when the process by which a law is enacted violates the 
procedure laid out by the Constitution or in some other law. The prime 
example of the adoption of this approach is the US Supreme Court decision 
in the case of Powell v McCormack.55 This was a case in which the petitioner 
was elected to serve in the United States House of Representatives for the 
19th Congress. However, the Congress passed a resolution that due to his 
financial misconduct in the preceding Congress he would not be allowed to 
sit as a member in the new Congress. He challenged his being disbarred 
on the ground that it violated Article 1 of the Constitution. The court found 
that the Constitution provided the requirements for the eligibility of people 
to be elected to congress – namely, age, citizenship, and residence. Thus, 
Congress had no power to exclude a person from sitting as a member of 
congress.56 
It is now almost settled that when parliament violates internal procedures 
laid out by the Constitution itself, the courts will intervene. However, in this 
new approach the courts are battling with the sensitive balance of 
respecting parliament but at the same time checking that parliament 
complies with the law relating to its own internal affairs.57 This challenge, as 
                                            
legislatures have undoubtedly plenary powers. But these powers are controlled by 
the basic concepts of the written Constitution itself which is supreme and sovereign. 
Therefore, there can be no doubt that the sovereignty which can be claimed by the 
Parliament in England, cannot be claimed by any legislature in India". 
54  Field v Clark 143 US 649 (1892). And the rule has been fairly established in the US. 
See the decisions in Dombrowski v Eastland, 387 US 82 (1967); United States v 
Johnson 383 US 169 (1966); Tenney v Brandhove 341 US 367 (1951); and Kilbourn 
v Thompson 103 US 168 (1881) (hereafter the Kilbourn case). 
55  Powell v McCormack 395 US 486 (1969). 
56  The Court at 199 quoted with approval the dictum from the Kilbourn case, thus: 
"[e]specially is it competent and proper for this court to consider whether its [the 
legislature's] proceedings are in conformity with the Constitution and laws because, 
living under a written constitution, no branch or department of the government is 
supreme, and it is the province and duty of the judicial department to determine, in 
cases regularly brought before them, whether the powers of any branch of the 
government, and even those of the legislature in the enactment of laws, have been 
exercised in conformity to the Constitution, and, if they have not, to treat their acts 
as null and void". 
57  See the Supreme Court of Israel decision in Sarid v Knesset Speaker (1981) 36 (2) 
PD 198 203. The court said: "It seems to me that the clash of the said values of rule 
of law, on the one hand, and respect for the unique character of the Knesset, on the 
other, require forging a judicial balance based on self-restraint of the judiciary, which 
does not amount to being totally bound." 
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will more fully be demonstrated later in this paper, is more pronounced in 
South Africa. 
3 Judicial review of the legislative process in Lesotho 
The parliamentary procedures in Lesotho are based on the British model of 
parliamentary practice.58 As one commentator accurately commented, 
writing about its similarity to the British model:59 
Certainly the physical pattern is that of Westminster, down to the dispatch 
boxes presented by the British House of Commons and the Gentleman Usher 
of the Black Rod, who looks just as much the part as does his British 
namesake. In its anxiety not to deviate from British parliamentary practice 
indeed the National Assembly is officially converted into an upper house for 
the Speech from the Throne by the simple expedient of a ritual draping of the 
Speaker's chair with royal purple. 
The general reticence of Lesotho's judiciary to review the legislative work of 
parliament started prior to the 1993 Constitution, when the courts almost 
invariably declined to exercise either substantive or procedural review. The 
maiden case of this approach was the case of Khaketla v The Honourable 
Prime Minister.60 The case arose out of the run-up to the much derided 1985 
election.61 In casu, with a view to minimising the participation of the 
opposition, the government amended the electoral law to increase both the 
number of people required for the endorsement of a candidate and the fee 
for the registration of a candidate.62 The applicant challenged the law on the 
basis, amongst others, that it violated the right to vote and to be voted for, 
as enshrined in the Human Rights Act.63 The court frowned upon such a 
prayer and remarked that in terms of Lesotho's constitutional law "however 
unjust, arbitrary or inconvenient any legislation may be, it must be given its 
full effect. It is not the province of the Court to scan its wisdom or policy and 
the Court must take the statute as it finds it".64 This approach was replicated 
in the 1992 decision of the High Court in the case of Tsang v Minister of 
                                            
58  Palmer and Poulter Legal System of Lesotho 305-316. In the case of Law Society of 
Lesotho v Ramodibedi (Constitutional Case No 1 of 2003) [2003] LSHC 89 (15 
August 2003) Maqutu J at para 7 shared a similar view thus, "[i]t seems to me that 
the present constitutional dispensation is a continuation of a tradition that Lesotho 
has inherited from Britain. Time and time again when constitutional problems arise 
Britain is our first reference point". 
59  Macartney 1970 Parliamentary Affairs 121. 
60  Khaketla case 19.  
61  D'Oliveira 1986 Africa Insight 6. 
62  Electoral Amendment Act 10 of 1984. 
63  Human Rights Act 24 of 1983. It is important to note that from the time that the 1966 
(independence) Constitution was suspended in 1970, the Human Rights Act (1983) 
was the only law that embodied high constitutional norms against which the actions 
of government could be measured. 
64  Khaketla case 19. 
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Foreign Affairs.65 However, the tenability of the principle enunciated in these 
two cases was convincingly refuted by Mahomed JA in the Court of Appeal 
decision in Attorney General v Swissbourgh Diamond Mine.66 The Court of 
Appeal said:67 
The doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, which had its origin in English law 
... never properly became part of the common law of South Africa or Lesotho 
and that it had merely been imposed and maintained as a matter of political 
expediency … . 
On the legislative process, the 1993 Constitution of Lesotho, like most 
Commonwealth constitutions,68 provides that subject to the Constitution 
each House of Parliament may regulate its own procedure and may in 
particular make rules for the orderly conduct of its own proceedings.69 The 
parliament in Lesotho is bicameral.70 However, a bill originates in the 
National Assembly.71 Due to its ancestral relationship with the British 
parliamentary practice, the parliamentary procedure is shielded from judicial 
review through an ouster clause.72 Section 80(5) of the Constitution 
provides that "a certificate given by the Speaker of the National Assembly 
under this section shall be conclusive for all purposes and shall not be 
questioned in any court".73 The opinion of the judiciary in Lesotho is divided 
about the legal effect of this clause. In the case of Development for Peace 
                                            
65  Tsang case 145. The court therein decreed that the "[t]he law of Lesotho is the same 
as the law of England and Republic of South Africa. An Act of Parliament is supreme. 
Once it has been properly passed by the Military Council the courts must give effect 
to it". 
66  Swissbourgh Diamond Mine case 214. 
67  Swissbourgh Diamond Mine case 225. 
68  For the analysis of the Zimbabwean Constitution on the similar provisions see the 
case of Biti v Minister Justice Legal and Parliamentary Affairs 2002 ZWSC 9 (27 
February 2002). 
69  Section 81(1) of the Constitution of Lesotho. S 81(3) provides for the power to confer 
privileges thus,"[p]arliament may, for the purpose of the orderly and effective 
discharge of the business of the two Houses, make provision for the powers, 
privileges and immunities of those Houses and the Committees and the members 
thereof (including any person who is President or Vice-President or Speaker or 
Deputy Speaker of either House, having been elected from among persons who 
were not members thereof." 
70  Section 54 of the Constitution of Lesotho. 
71  Section 78(2) of the Constitution of Lesotho. 
72  The clause is apparently not the only constitutional clause under the 1993 
Constitution of Lesotho. Also see s 91(5), which provides that "… where the King is 
required by this Constitution to act in accordance with the advice of any person or 
authority, the question whether he has received or acted in accordance with such 
advice shall not be enquired into in any court." 
73  This clause is common in many constitutions that follow the classic parliamentary 
practice. Salva 1963 Philip LJ 477. 
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Education v Speaker of the National Assembly74 the Constitutional Court75 
refused to penetrate the clause to investigate whether in the enactment of 
the Human Rights Commission Act76 the National Assembly complied with 
section 80(3) of the Constitution. The court dismissed the application and 
reasoned that:77 
It should at all times be recognised that the Parliament of Lesotho has the 
power under the Constitution to make laws and to regulate its own procedure 
and processes and in particular to make rules for the orderly conduct of its 
own proceedings. This is a fundamental aspect of its legislative power vested 
in it by the Constitution and one that is indeed expressive of the doctrine of 
'separation of powers'. 
However, in the most recent decision in Mokhothu v Speaker of the National 
Assembly,78 the same court categorically demonstrated its willingness to 
pierce through the ouster clause if the law has been violated. In this case 
the applicant was deprived of his status as the official leader of opposition 
after his party lost one member of parliament to the government. The 
speaker did this despite the fact that the other opposition parties had written 
to assure the speaker that they supported the first applicant as the official 
leader of opposition. The decision of the speaker was made by way of a 
ruling on a point of order that was raised by the Minister of Forestry.79 The 
                                            
74  Development for Peace Education v Speaker of the National Assembly (No 5/2016) 
[2017] LSHC 5 (13 March 2017) (hereafter the Development for Peace Education 
case). 
75  It is important to note that the Constitution of Lesotho does not establish a superior 
court called "the Constitutional Court". It is the High Court that has original jurisdiction 
to adjudicate over constitutional matters. However, the phrase the "Constitutional 
Court" began to be heard in the year 2000 after the adoption of the Constitutional 
Litigation Rules (Legal Notice 194 of 2000). The rules provide for a special procedure 
for constitutional matters. The Court of Appeal in the case of Chief Justice v Law 
Society (C of A CIV NO/59/2011) [2012] LSCA 3 (27 April 2012) confirmed that when 
the High Court is sitting in terms of Constitutional Litigation Rules, the bench must 
be constituted by no less than three judges. 
76  Human Rights Commission Act 2 of 2016. 
77  Development for Peace Education case para 21.  
78  Mokhothu v Speaker of the National Assembly (Constitutional Case No 20/2017) 
2017 LHC 20 (21 February 2018) (hereafter the Mokhothu case). Also in the case of 
All Basotho Convention v Speaker of the National Assembly (CIV/APN/406/2016) 
[2017] LSHC 1 (23 February 2017), the court declared that the Speaker did not have 
the power to make a pronouncement of the vacancy of a seat of Parliament. The 
Speaker in casu had declared vacancies in the National Assembly in a situation 
where certain members of parliament failed to attend the necessary number of 
sittings of the National Assembly as provided for in s 60(1)(g) of the Constitution. 
The case did not deal with the review of the internal proceedings of parliament per 
se, but it is one of the rare occasions in Lesotho where the judiciary stood firm and 
reviewed the decisions of parliament or its officials.  
79  The Minister rose on a point order and said, "… I consider that one quarter of this 
House's Membership consists of 30 Members, what then with the recent drastic 
changes (i.e. floor-crossing)? To me, there is no political party with the 1/4 (30 
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Speaker’s defence was that the ruling was an internal proceeding and that 
it was protected by privilege as codified by the ouster clause in section 80(3) 
of the Constitution. The court rejected the argument and upheld the 
application. It reasoned that:80 
Parliament is a creature of the Constitution. It is conferred with powers under 
section 81(1) to make rules to regulate its own procedure and orderly conduct 
in each House. That power is 'subject to the provisions of this Constitution. 
These quoted words indicate that the rule-making power of Parliament is not 
absolute but limited by the provisions of the Constitution. Thus, this Court has 
jurisdiction and power to declare the Speaker's rulings, rules, practice or 
usage of Parliament invalid if inconsistent with or violative of any part of the 
Constitution. 
Here the court is trying to align itself with the modern interventionist 
approach to internal parliamentary proceedings. However, the most 
inhibiting aspect of Lesotho's constitutional law is that the Constitution 
protects the internal proceedings of parliament through a conclusive 
certificate of the Speaker of the National Assembly. Although the court 
makes a generalised statement in Mokhothu's case that the court will 
declare the "Speaker's rulings, rules, practice or usage of Parliament invalid 
if inconsistent with or violative of any part of the Constitution", it did not 
address itself to the effect of section 80(3) of the Constitution, which 
embodies the ouster of the courts.81 A dedicated interpretation of this 
section by the court could have helped shape the jurisprudence around the 
clause, and to definitively overrule the previous decisions which follow the 
non-interventionist approach.82 
4 Review of legislative process in South Africa 
Prior to the 1994 politico-legal transition,83 South African constitutional law 
was overshadowed by parliamentary sovereignty.84 The general attitude of 
the courts was that the courts would ordinarily not overturn the work of 
                                            
Members) majority to qualify for the Official Leader of the Opposition. Can you kindly 
guide us on the proper procedure in this regard?" 
80  Mokhothu case para 14. For this approach the Court relied on the Namibian 
Supreme Court decision in Federal Convention of Namibia v Speaker, National 
Assembly of Namibia 1994 1 SA 177 (Nra HC) and the South African Supreme Court 
Decision in the De Lille case. 
81  It should be noted that this is a constitutional ouster clause; not an ordinary statutory 
ouster clause. 
82  See the Nigerian case of The Resident, Badan Province v Memudu Lagunju 14 
WACA 549. 
83  Mureinik 1994 SAJHR 31; Ramaite Role of the Judiciary 150. 
84  Poovalingam v Rajbansi 1992 1 SA 283 (A). The court in casu admitted that there is 
a "close bond between [South African] law and English law on the subject of 
parliamentary privilege". Laubscher 1981 SALJ 529; Daniels and Brickhill 2006 Penn 
St Int'l L Rev 371. 
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parliament.85 Both the substantive and the procedural review of parliament 
were ordinarily not available. However, there were exceptional occasions 
when the judiciary, as in England,86 used procedural impropriety as a 
ground for overturning an Act of parliament.87 As early as 1937 the court in 
the Ndlwana v Hofmeyr88 case declined jurisdiction to enquire into 
legislation that had in effect been unprocedurally enacted. The law had been 
enacted by two Houses sitting together and not bi-camerally as the law 
prescribed.89 However the court expressly, and rather bizarrely remarked 
that even if the procedure had been flouted in the legislative process, "the 
question then is whether a Court of Law can declare that a Sovereign 
Parliament cannot validly pronounce its will unless it adopts a certain 
procedure in this case a procedure impliedly indicated as usual in the South 
Africa Act?"90 The court proceeded to provide the answer for the question 
that "Parliament, composed of its three constituent elements, can adopt any 
procedure it thinks fit. The procedure express or implied in the South Africa 
Act is so far as Courts of Law are concerned at the mercy of Parliament like 
everything else."91 In adopting this absolute non-interventionist approach 
the court was following the decision in R v Ndobe.92 The subsequent 
decisions in in the Harris93 cases expressly deviated from those in the 
Ndlwana and Ndobe cases. The court adopted an interventionist approach 
where the parliament had violated the procedure laid out by the South Africa 
Act to enact the Separate Representation of Voters Act, 1951.94 The court 
unequivocally departed from Ndlwana.95 Despite the approach taken in the 
Harris cases, the court in Collins v Minister of the Interior96 unexpectedly 
declined to intervene in a case where the law was passed bi-camerally when 
                                            
85  Cowen 1952 MLR 282. 
86  R (Jackson) v Attorney General [2006] 1 AC 262. See further Craig "Sovereignty of 
the United Kingdom Parliament" 359; Eekelaar 1997 LQR 185. 
87  Harris v Minister of the Interior 1952 2 All SA 400 (A) and Collins v Minister of the 
Interior 1957 1 All SA 227 (A) (hereafter the Collins case). 
88  Ndlwana v Hofmeyr 1937 AD 229 (hereafter the Ndlwana case) 237. See also 
Griswold 1953 Harv L Rev 864. 
89  Section 35(1) of the Union of South African Act, 1909. 
90  Ndlwana case 238. 
91  Ndlwana case 238. 
92  R v Ndobe 1930 AD 484. 
93  Harris v Minister of the Interior 1952 2 All SA 400 (A); Minister of the Interior v Harris 
1952 4 All SA 376 (A). 
94  Separate Representation of Voters Act 46 of 1951. Also see Griswold 1953 Harv L 
Rev 864. 
95  In Harris v Minister of the Interior 1952 2 All SA 400 (A) 423 the court said, "The 
question now arises whether this Court ought to depart from Ndlwana's case. Earlier 
in this judgment I have referred to a number of cases which show that there may be 
circumstances in which the Court ought to depart from its previous decision. There 
is no doubt in my mind that this is essentially a case where this Court is bound, on it 
shaving been shown that its previous decision was wrong, to depart from that 
decision".  
96  Collins case 227. 
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it was supposed to be passed uni-camerally in terms of the South African 
Act; and its purpose was clearly the same purpose which the parliament 
unsuccessfully sought to attain in the Harris case. The court ruled that "[i]f 
a Legislature has plenary power to legislate on a particular matter no 
question can arise as to the validity of any legislation on that matter and 
such legislation is valid whatever the real purpose of that legislation is".97 
The 1996 Constitution of South Africa seems to have made a clear break 
from a past which was based on parliamentary sovereignty and accepted a 
new system based on constitutionalism.98 While the Constitution seems to 
have retained the common law notion of parliamentary privilege,99 it has 
also made two fundamental modifications of the concept. The first one is 
that it has removed the ouster clause that usually precludes judicial scrutiny 
of the legislative process. The second one is that the common law on 
parliamentary privilege has been constitutionalised; thus, any aspect of the 
concept which has not been codified in the Constitution is not permissible.100 
This approach was adopted in the landmark decision in The Speaker of the 
National Assembly v Patricia De Lille.101 The case involved the suspension 
of a member of parliament through a resolution of the National Assembly on 
the basis that her speech in parliament was "un-parliamentary". She had 
alleged that her party had information pertaining to twelve members of the 
"other side of the House (the ANC) who had been accused of having been 
spies for the apartheid regime". She was suspended for fifteen 
parliamentary working days. She challenged the suspension. The Speaker, 
in her argument, wanted to claim the protection of parliamentary privilege. 
The court rejected that line of argument and said that the "enquiry must 
crucially rest on the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa…[not] a 
tortuous process of discovery of some obscure rule in English Parliamentary 
law and custom justifying the suspension of a member of Parliament."102 In 
the end, Mahomed CJ found that "there is nothing which provides any 
constitutional authority for the Assembly, to punish any member of the 
Assembly, for making any speech, through an order suspending such 
member from the proceedings of the Assembly".103 
                                            
97  Collins case 231. 
98  Mureinik 1994 SAJHR 31. 
99  Section 57 of the Constitution provides that: "(1) The National Assembly may - (a) 
determine and control its internal arrangements, proceedings and procedures; and 
(b) make rules and orders concerning its business, with due regard to representative 
and participatory democracy, accountability, transparency and public involvement". 
Also see s 58. 
100  On the relationship between common law and the Constitution in South Africa, see 
Friedman 2014 SAJHR 63. 
101  See De Lille case.  
102  De Lille paras 14 and 20. 
103  De Lille para 29. 
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The approach of the court in Patricia De Lille became the trailblazer. In the 
Doctors for Life International case, the Constitutional Court reiterated that 
there is no express constitutional provision that precludes a court in South 
African from intervening in the legislative process. The court brought in the 
notion of the "sensitive balance", however. It said:104 
What courts should strive to achieve is the appropriate balance between their 
role as the ultimate guardians of the Constitution and the rule of law including 
any obligation that Parliament is required to fulfil in respect of the passage of 
laws, on the one hand, and the respect which they are required to accord to 
other branches of government as required by the principle of separation of 
powers, on the other hand. 
This approach is slightly different from the one suggested in the UDM case 
of non-intervention "save in extreme cases".105 With the approach in South 
Africa now fairly well established that the courts can intervene in the 
legislative process, the courts are now grappling with the notion of the 
"sensitive balance" as provided for in the Doctors for Life International case. 
The Constitution and the rule of law occupy one side of the scale, while the 
separation of powers occupies the other. The court grappled with this 
balance in the Mazibuko case. This is the case that concerned the tabling 
of a motion of no confidence in the President. The applicant, as a leader of 
the opposition in Parliament, gave notice in the National Assembly of a 
motion of no confidence in the President in terms of section 102(2) of the 
Constitution. The motion was frustrated by parliament committees so that it 
was ultimately not tabled before the National Assembly. The applicant then 
approached the High Court on an urgent basis, seeking an order directing 
the Speaker to take the necessary steps to ensure that the motion of no 
confidence was debated and voted upon as a matter of urgency. The vexed 
question was whether a court could direct a Speaker to place a motion on a 
parliamentary roll when there was no consensus in the committees. The 
court was sharply divided106 over this question. The majority judgement 
authored by Moseneke DCJ found that the speaker does not have such 
residual powers,107 but disagreed with the respondents’ argument that "[i]f 
                                            
104  See Doctors for Life International case 1427.  
105  UDM case para 31. The "non-intervention save in extreme cases" approach does 
not seem to be an approach different from the sensitive balance approach, though. 
The only difference is that in the former, the scale is tilted in favour of non-
intervention, while in the latter it is balanced. 
106  The court comprised 10 justices and the division was in the ratio of 6:4. The majority 
comprised Moseneke DCJ with Froneman, Khampepe, Nkabinde, Skweyiya and 
Van der Westhuizen JJ concurring, while the minority comprised Jafta J, Mogoeng 
CJ, Zondo J and Mhlantla AJ. 
107  The court seems to have attempted the balancing exercise thus (para 31 of the 
Mazibuko case): "Section 57(1) of the Constitution vests in the Assembly the power 
to determine and control its internal arrangements, proceedings and procedures, and 
it may make rules and orders concerning its business. Should the Speaker choose 
to make a ruling on the business of the Assembly, it would always be subject to the 
H ‘NYANE  PER / PELJ 2019 (22)  19 
there is no political agreement on the scheduling of the motion, then that is 
the end of the matter and the motion will not be scheduled or debated."108 
He agreed with the court a quo (the High Court) that:109 
… a vital constitutional entitlement to move a motion of no confidence in the 
President cannot be left to the whim of the majority or minority in the 
Programme Committee or any other committee of the Assembly. It would be 
inimical to the vital purpose of section 102(2) to accept that a motion of no 
confidence in the President may never reach the Assembly except with the 
generosity and concurrence of the majority in that Committee. 
The court in turn invalidated Chapter 12 of the Rules of the National 
Assembly to the extent that it does not provide for enforcement of the right 
to exercise the power to have a motion of no confidence in the President 
“scheduled for a debate and voted upon in the National Assembly within a 
reasonable time, or at all."110 The minority judgement held a different view. 
In fact, it invoked the political question doctrine111 wherein Jafta J, writing 
for the minority, contended that "[p]olitical issues must be resolved at a 
political level. Our courts should not be drawn into political disputes, the 
resolution of which falls appropriately within the domain of other fora 
established in terms of the Constitution."112 
The "sensitive balance" seems to be haunting the courts in South Africa, 
and it continues to sharply divide judicial and scholarly opinion.113 The most 
recent decision on the review of parliamentary process where the division 
of judicial opinion further manifested itself was in the case of Economic 
Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly.114 The central 
question in this case was whether the National Assembly had breached its 
obligation to put in place "mechanisms and a process" for the 
                                            
overriding authority of the Assembly, which is the ultimate master of its own process, 
subject to the usual caveat that its processes are consistent with the Constitution 
and the law." 
108  Mazibuko case para 54. 
109  Mazibuko case para 57. 
110  Mazibuko case para 88. 
111  The doctrine has its roots in American constitutional law. It provides that certain 
constitutional questions are best left to the elected branches of government and are 
therefore non-justiciable. Mhango 2014 PELJ 2704. Also see Barkow 2002 Colum L 
Rev 237; Choper 2004 Duke LJ 1457. 
112  Mazibuko case para 83. The minority was persuaded by the dictum in the court a 
quo Mazibuko v Sisulu 2013 4 SA 243 (WCC) 256EH thus, "There is a danger in 
South Africa, however, of the politicisation of the judiciary, drawing the judiciary into 
every and all political disputes as if there is no other forum to deal with a political 
impasse relating to policy or disputes which clearly carry polycentric consequences 
beyond the scope of adjudication."  
113  See the cases United Democratic Movement v Speaker, National Assembly 2017 5 
SA 300 (CC). Also see the EFF I case para 93; Cachalia 2015 NYL Sch L Rev 379.  
114  Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly 2018 3 BCLR 259 
(CC) (hereafter the EFF II case). 
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implementation of section 89 of the Constitution. The section provides for 
the impeachment of the President.115 As in the Mazibuko case, the question 
sharply divided the court by a vote of 7:4. The majority judgement was 
authored by Jafta J, who found that "section 89(1) implicitly imposes an 
obligation on the Assembly to make rules specially tailored for an 
impeachment process contemplated in that section."116 The court in turn 
found that the National Assembly had violated that obligation, and directed 
it to make rules that would facilitate the implementation of section 89 of the 
Constitution. The minority vehemently disagreed that the court had any role 
to play in directing the National Assembly to make rules. Mogoeng CJ, 
concurring in the minority judgement, called the majority judgment "a 
textbook case of judicial overreach - a constitutionally impermissible 
intrusion by the Judiciary into the exclusive domain of Parliament."117 The 
minority judgment's chief argument was that the principle of the separation 
of powers prohibits the court from going so far as to tell the parliament to 
make rules. 
This dichotomy in the judicial approach is the manifestation of the stage at 
which the development of the parliament-judiciary relationship has reached 
in South Africa. The country is grappling with the "sensitive balance". The 
approach seems to be developing and firming up on a case-by-case basis. 
5  Conclusion 
This paper set out to investigate the judicial review of the legislative process 
in Lesotho, the principal question being the extent to which superior courts 
in Lesotho are able to review the internal processes of parliament. Having 
thus found, the paper sought to establish whether the South African 
jurisprudence on the subject can provide lessons for Lesotho. It has become 
apparent from the foregoing discussion that the two countries have different 
approaches to the judicial review of internal parliamentary processes. Due 
largely to the influence of British tradition, Lesotho still subscribes to the 
                                            
115  Section 89 of the Constitution provides: "(1) The National Assembly, by a resolution 
adopted with a supporting vote of at least two thirds of its members, may remove the 
President from office only on the grounds of — (a) a serious violation of the 
Constitution or the law; (b) serious misconduct; or (c) inability to perform the 
functions of office. (2) Anyone who has been removed from the office of President in 
terms of subsection (1)(a) or (b) may not receive any benefits of that office, and may 
not serve in any public office." 
116  EFF II case para 196. 
117  EFF II case para 223. The Judges in the Majority Judgement did not take the 
expression "text book case of judicial overreach" kindly. As a result, Jafta J at para 
218 retorted that "... what is unprecedented is the suggestion that the construction 
of the section embraced by the majority here constitutes 'a textbook case of judicial 
overreach'. The suggestion is misplaced and unfortunate". 
H ‘NYANE  PER / PELJ 2019 (22)  21 
classic common law approach. This is the approach that absolutely protects 
the "internal proceedings" of parliament from scrutiny. The approach has 
been taken to the constitutional level by section 80(5) of the Constitution of 
Lesotho. The section, as demonstrated above, precludes the courts from 
enquiring into the certificate of the Speaker confirming that the procedure in 
enacting a law was properly followed. The courts in Lesotho have largely 
remained helpless against this ouster.118 An outlier is the Mokhothu's case, 
in which the court sought to demonstrate that on the basis of 
constitutionalism and legality it can review the internal proceedings of 
parliament. But the Mokhothu case will scarcely become an authority for the 
proposition that courts can readily review internal parliamentary 
proceedings in Lesotho. This is because the case exists alongside the 
constitutional ouster clause which has not been authoritatively interpreted, 
as is the case in countries such as Nigeria.119  
The South African approach, on the other hand, demonstrates a clear break 
from the approach in the pre-democratic era as epitomised by the Ndlwana 
and Collins cases.120 The case of De Lille is the standard bearer of the new 
approach, which is based on easy intervention of the courts once a 
constitution or some other law has been violated. The challenge with the 
new approach in South Africa, though, is that it vacillates between two 
equally important constitutional fundamentals: the notion of judicial review 
(based on legality) on the one hand and the separation of powers on the 
other. This balancing exercise has not yet stabilised. The instability is 
evidenced by the sharp difference in judicial opinion on the subject as 
manifested in cases such as UDM and the two EFF cases.121 It would seem 
that the country is building jurisprudence on this new issue on a case-by-
case basis. 
In the circumstances, it is recommended that Lesotho should introduce a 
paradigmatic shift similar to that made in South Africa. The first step would 
be to abolish all vestiges of parliamentary sovereignty in Lesotho; and to 
remove the ouster clause from section 80(5) of the Constitution. 
Consequently, the common law notion of parliamentary privilege should be 
recast within the context of the modern idea of constitutionalism. 
                                            
118  Generally see the Development for Peace Education and Transformation Resource 
Centre case. 
119  See the Nigerian approach to constitutional ouster clauses in cases like The 
Resident, Badan Province v Memudu Lagunju 14 WACA 549; Governor-in-Council, 
Western Region of Nigeria v Jonathan Oshunlaja (1961) 1 SCNLR 303; Prince 
Ademuluyi v Brig RA Adebayo (1968) 2 All NLR 272; Lakanmi v Attorney General, 
West (1971) 1 UILR 201. 
120  Wade 1957 SALJ 160; Dlamini 1988 SALJ 470. 
121  For a critique on the seeming judicial activism in relation to the legislature in South 
Africa, see Cachalia 2015 NYL Sch L Rev 379. 
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